The early St. Augustine on question of the pre-existence of souls

The early St. Augustine on question of the pre-existence of souls

In what follows, I report a long quotation from a treatise of the early St. Augustine (354-430), ‘De libero arbitrio voluntatis’ (one can learn a brief introduction on this book here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_libero_arbitrio_voluntatis ). Curiously enough, in the third book of this treatise (written apparently in the early 390s), Augustine says what follows about the question of the origin of souls (for the English translation of the Latin text I used ChatGPT as I can’t translate Latin on my own, so there’s that – the discussion about the origin of souls starts at paragraph 56 but I think paragraphs 54-55 might be useful for context):

“54. Ignorance and difficulty as consequences of sin

54. For whatever a person does wrongly through ignorance, and whatever he wishes to do rightly but is unable to do, is called sin because it derives its origin from that sin of the free will. For the preceding sin merited these subsequent consequences. Just as we use the word tongue to mean not only the bodily member that we move in our mouth when we speak, but also what follows from the movement of that member—that is, the form and character of our speech, according to which we speak of one language as Greek and another as Latin—so we use the word sin to mean not only that sin which is properly called sin, since it is committed knowingly and by free choice, but also that which necessarily follows as a punishment for it. We likewise use the word nature in two different senses. Properly speaking, we mean the nature of man in which he was originally created, in his own kind, without fault; but we also use it for the condition in which, as a consequence of the punishment inflicted upon that condemned man, we are born mortal, ignorant, and subject to the flesh. In this sense the Apostle says: “For we too were by nature children of wrath, like the rest.”

55. The condition inherited from the first parents

55. Now, that we are born from that first union both in ignorance and in difficulty and in mortality was, in the supreme and most just judgment of the Ruler of all things, pleasing to God, since our first parents, after they had sinned, were plunged into error, misery, and death. Thus, at the very beginning of human life, the justice of the One who punishes might be revealed, while throughout its course the mercy of the One who liberates might also be revealed. For the happiness of the first condemned man was not taken away in such a way that his power of reproduction was also removed. From his offspring, even though they would be carnal and mortal, it was possible for something beautiful and honorable, according to its own kind, to arise and adorn the earth. Yet it would not have been just for him to produce offspring better than himself. Rather, when a person turns back toward God, he should not merely be permitted to overcome the punishment which his origin had deserved by turning away from God; he should also be helped to do so. Even in this way the Creator of all things demonstrated how easily man could have retained the condition in which he had been created, had he wished to do so, since his descendants were capable of surpassing the condition into which they had been born.

56. The origin of individual souls

56. Furthermore, if one soul was created from which the souls of all human beings born thereafter are derived, who can say that he did not sin when the first man sinned? But if souls are individually created in each person who is born, then it is not unreasonable—indeed, it appears most fitting and perfectly ordered—that the evil merit of the earlier person should become the nature of the one who follows, while the good merit of the one who follows should become the nature of the earlier one. For what is there unworthy of the Creator if He wished even in this way to demonstrate the extraordinary dignity of souls in comparison with bodily creatures? One soul may descend to the condition from which another has risen. When that sinful soul has reached a state of ignorance and difficulty, this is rightly called a punishment, because it was better before it incurred this punishment. If, therefore, another soul begins its existence in a condition like that which another soul acquired only after a sinful life—not merely before committing sin, but before it had lived any part of its own life—that soul nevertheless possesses no small good for which it should give thanks to its Creator. For its very origin and beginning are better than any perfected bodily creature. These are not insignificant goods: not only is it a soul, and therefore by its very nature superior to every body, but it also possesses the capacity, with the Creator's help, to cultivate itself and, through devoted effort, to acquire and grasp all the virtues by which it may be freed from the distressing difficulty and the blinding ignorance in which it finds itself. If this is so, then ignorance and difficulty in which souls are born are not the punishment for sin, but an invitation to make progress and the beginning of perfection. For even before any merit arising from good works, it is no small gift to have received a natural judgment by which one prefers wisdom to error and tranquility to difficulty, so that one may attain these things not merely by being born, but by striving for them. If, however, a person refuses to act, he is rightly held guilty of sin, because he has failed to make good use of the capacity he received. Although a soul may therefore be born in ignorance and difficulty, it is not compelled by any necessity to remain in the condition in which it was born. And certainly no one but the almighty God could be the Creator even of such souls: He who brings into existence those who do not yet love Him, and restores those who do love Him; He who grants existence even to those who do not yet exist, and grants blessedness to those who love Him, from whom they have received their existence.

57. Souls sent into bodies

57. But if souls already existing somewhere in the secret places of God are sent into the bodies of individual human beings at birth, in order to animate and govern them, then surely they are sent for this purpose: that, by governing well the body which is born as a consequence of the punishment for sin—that is, the mortality inherited from the first man—and by disciplining it through the virtues and subjecting it to an orderly and lawful service, they too may in due course obtain their place among the incorruptible inhabitants of heaven. When such souls enter this life and take upon themselves mortal limbs that they must bear, they must also undergo both forgetfulness of their former life and the labor of the present one. From this there arises that ignorance and difficulty which, in the first man, were the punishment of mortality and served to weigh upon the soul in its misery; but in these souls they become instead the doorway to a service by which the incorruption of the body may ultimately be restored. Even in this case these conditions are called sins only because the flesh, coming from the lineage of the sinner, imposes this ignorance and difficulty upon the souls that enter it. Neither the souls nor the Creator should therefore be blamed for them. For God has given these souls both the ability to do good through their difficult tasks and the path of faith amid the blindness of forgetfulness. He has also given them judgment: every soul acknowledges that it ought to seek what it uselessly fails to know, to persevere in the labors proper to its calling in order to overcome the difficulty of doing what is right, and to ask its Creator for help, so that He may assist it in its efforts. He has commanded us to strive, either through the law given outwardly or through His voice speaking within the heart, and He prepares the glory of the most blessed city for those who triumph over the one who first brought mankind into this misery by his evil persuasion. These souls, however, take upon themselves this misery in order to conquer him through the best of all weapons: faith. For it is no small glory to wage war against the devil by accepting the very punishment through which he boasts that he conquered man. But whoever, captivated by the love of this present life, neglects this task cannot justly blame anyone but himself for abandoning the command of his king. Rather, under the authority of the Lord of all, he will be assigned his place among the forces of the one whose shameful reward he loved when he deserted his camp.

58. If souls enter bodies of their own accord

58. But if souls that exist elsewhere are not sent by the Lord God, but come of their own accord to inhabit bodies, then it is already easy to see that whatever ignorance and difficulty follows must be attributed to their own will, and that the Creator is in no way to be blamed for it. For even if God Himself had sent them, He would still be entirely free from blame, since He did not deprive them, even amid ignorance and difficulty, of the free will by which they could ask, seek, and strive. He would give to those who ask, show the way to those who seek, and open the door to those who knock. He ordained that this ignorance and difficulty should serve those who are diligent and well-disposed as a means of attaining the crown of glory. But toward those who are negligent and wish to defend their sins by appealing to their weakness, He would not count ignorance and difficulty themselves as a crime. Rather, He would punish them justly because they preferred to remain in that condition instead of reaching truth and ease through the diligence of seeking and learning, and through the humility of confession and prayer.

59. We must speak cautiously about the soul and about God

59. Of these four opinions concerning the soul—whether souls come through generation; whether new souls are created individually in each person who is born; whether souls already existing somewhere are divinely sent into the bodies of those who are born; or whether they enter those bodies of their own accord—we ought not rashly affirm any one of them. Either this question has not yet been sufficiently worked out and clarified by Catholic interpreters of the divine Scriptures, because of its obscurity and difficulty; or, if this has already been done, writings of that kind have not yet come into our hands. Let our faith merely remain firm that we must not conceive of the substance of the Creator as anything false or unworthy of Him. For He is the One toward whom we are journeying along the path of piety. If, therefore, we form an idea of Him that differs from what He truly is, our journey will lead us not toward blessedness but toward vanity. As for the created order, if we hold some opinion about it that differs from reality, there is no danger, provided that we do not cling to that opinion as though it were something known and established with certainty. For we are not commanded to journey toward the creature in order to become blessed, but toward the Creator Himself. If, concerning Him, we are persuaded of something other than what we ought to believe and other than what He truly is, we are deceived by an extremely destructive error. For if we pursue something that either does not exist or, even if it does exist, cannot make us blessed, no one can reach the blessed life.”

For reference here is the Latin text:

“... cum peccati sint poena...

19. 54. Nam illud quod ignorans quisque non recte facit, et quod recte volens facere non potest, ideo dicuntur peccata, quia de peccato illo liberae voluntatis originem ducunt: illud enim praecedens meruit ista sequentia. Nam sicut linguam dicimus non solum membrum quod movemus in ore dum loquimur, sed etiam illud quod huius membri motum consequitur, id est formam tenoremque verborum, secundum quem modum dicitur alia lingua graeca, alia latina: sic non solum peccatum illud dicimus, quod proprie vocatur peccatum, libera enim voluntate et ab sciente committitur; sed etiam illud quod iam de huius supplicio consequatur necesse est. Sic etiam ipsam naturam aliter dicimus, cum proprie loquimur, naturam hominis, in qua primum in suo genere inculpabilis factus est: aliter istam, in qua ex illius damnati poena, et mortales et ignari et carni subditi nascimur; iuxta quem modum dicit Apostolus, Fuimus enim et nos naturaliter filii irae, sicut et caeteri ¹³.

... quae de primo coniugio procedit...

20. 55. Ut autem de illo primo coniugio, et cum ignorantia, et cum difficultate, et cum mortalitate nascamur, quoniam illi cum peccavissent, et in errorem, et in aerumnam, et in mortem praecipitati sunt, rerum moderatori summo Deo iustissime placuit; ut et in ortu hominis originaliter appareret iustitia punientis, et in provectu misericordia liberantis. Non enim damnato primo homini sic adempta est beatitudo, ut etiam fecunditas adimeretur. Poterat enim et de prole eius, quamvis carnali et mortali, aliquod in suo genere fieri decus ornamentumque terrarum. Iamvero ut meliores gigneret quam ipse esset, non erat aequitatis: sed ex conversione ad Deum, ut vinceret quisque supplicium quod origo eius ex aversione meruerat, non solum volentem non prohiberi, sed etiam adiuvari oportebat; etiam sic enim rerum Creator ostendit quanta facilitate potuisset homo, si voluisset, retinere quod factus est, cum proles eius potuit etiam superare quod nata est.

... sive una sive singulae animae creatae sint...

20. 56. Deinde, si una anima facta est, ex qua omnium hominum animae trahuntur nascentium, quis potest dicere non se peccasse, cum primus ille peccavit? Si autem singillatim fiunt in unoquoque nascentium, non est perversum, imo convenientissimum et ordinatissimum apparet, ut malum meritum prioris, natura sequentis sit; et bonum meritum sequentis, natura prioris sit. Quid enim indignum, si etiam sic voluit Creator ostendere, usque adeo excellere creaturis corporeis animae dignitatem, ut ab eo gradu possit esse ortus alterius, ad quem alterius perductus est occasus? Nam cum ad ignorantiam difficultatemque pervenerit illa peccatrix, ideo poena recte dicitur, quia melior ante hanc poenam fuit. Si ergo altera talis esse coepit, non solum ante peccatum, sed ante omnem vitam suam, qualis alia post vitam culpabilem facta est, non parvum bonum habet, unde Conditori suo gratias agat; quia ipse ortus eius et inchoatio quovis perfecto corpore est melior. Non enim mediocria bona sunt, non solum quod anima est, qua natura iam omne corpus praecedit; sed etiam quod facultatem habet, ut adiuvante Creatore seipsam excolat, et pio studio possit omnes acquirere et capere virtutes, per quas et a difficultate cruciante, et ab ignorantia caecante liberetur. Quod si ita est, non erit nascentibus animis ignorantia et difficultas supplicium peccati, sed proficiendi admonitio, et perfectionis exordium. Non enim ante omne meritum boni operis parum est accepisse naturale iudicium, quo sapientiam praeponat errori, et quietem difficultati, ut ad haec non nascendo, sed studendo perveniat. Quod si agere noluerit, peccati rea iure tenebitur, tamquam quae non bene usa sit ea facultate quam accepit. Quamquam enim in ignorantia et difficultate nata sit, non tamen ad permanendum in eo quod nata est, aliqua necessitate comprimitur: neque omnino potuit nisi Deus omnipotens esse etiam talium creator animarum, quas et non dilectus ipse faciat, et diligens eas reficiat; qui et non existentibus praestat ut sint, et amantibus eum a quo sunt praestat ut beatae sint.

... sive iam existant et in corpora mittantur...

20. 57. Si vero in Dei aliquo secreto iam existentes animae mittuntur ad inspiranda et regenda corpora singulorum quorumque nascentium, ad hoc utique mittuntur officium, ut corpus quod de poena peccati, hoc est mortalitate primi hominis, nascitur, bene administrando, id est castigando per virtutes, et ordinatissimae atque legitimae servituti subiciendo, etiam ipsi comparent ordine atque tempore opportuno coelestis incorruptionis locum. Quae cum introeunt in hanc vitam, subeuntque gestanda membra mortalia, subeant etiam necesse est et oblivionem vitae prioris, et praesentis laborem: unde illa ignorantia et difficultas consequetur, quod in primo homine supplicium mortalitatis fuit, ad animi expendendam miseriam; in istis autem ianua ministerii ad reparandam corporis incorruptionem. Nam hoc quoque modo non dicuntur ista peccata, nisi quia caro de propagine veniens peccatoris, venientibus ad se animis hanc ignorantiam et difficultatem facit; quae neque his, neque Creatori tamquam culpanda tribuatur. Dedit enim ille et facultatem bene operandi in laboriosis officiis, et viam fidei in oblivionis caecitate; iudicium illud vel maxime, quod anima omnis et quaerendum esse concedit quod inutiliter nescit, et perseveranter in officiosis laboribus enitendum ad evincendam recte faciendi difficultatem, et opem a Creatore implorandam, ut conantem adiuvet; qui vel extrinsecus lege, vel in intimis cordis allocutione conandum esse praecepit, et praeparat civitatis beatissimae gloriam triumphantibus de illo qui primum hominem ad istam miseriam perduxit victum pessima suasione; quam miseriam isti suscipiunt ad eum vincendum optima fide. Non enim parvae gloriae militia est diabolum vincere eodem suscepto supplicio, quo se ille hominem victum perduxisse gloriatur. Quisquis autem hoc istius vitae captus amore neglexerit, nullo pacto iuste flagitium desertionis suae regis imperio deputabit: sed erit potius sub omnium Domino in eius partibus ordinatus, cuius turpe stipendium ut castra sua desereret, adamavit.

... sive sua sponte veniant.

20. 58. Si autem alibi animae constitutae non mittuntur a Domino Deo, sed sua sponte ad inhabitanda corpora veniunt; facile est iam hoc videre, quidquid ignorantiae difficultatisque secutum fuerit earum propriam voluntatem, nullo modo Creatorem hinc esse culpandum: quandoquidem etiamsi eas ipse misisset, quibus etiam in ipsa ignorantia et difficultate liberam voluntatem petendi et quaerendi et conandi non abstulit, daturus petentibus, demonstraturus quaerentibus, pulsantibus aperturus, omnino extra culpam esset. Hanc enim ignorantiam et difficultatem studiosis et benevolis evincendam, ad coronam gloriae valere praestaret; negligentibus autem et peccata sua de infirmitate defendere volentibus, non ipsam ignorantiam difficultatemque pro crimine obiceret; sed quia in eis potius permanere, quam studio quaerendi atque discendi, et humilitate confitendi atque orandi, ad veritatem ac facilitatem pervenire voluerunt, iusto supplicio vindicaret.

Caute de anima et de Deo loquendum.

20. 59. Harum autem quatuor de anima sententiarum, utrum de propagine veniant, an in singulis quibusque nascentibus novae fiant, an in corpora nascentium iam alicubi existentes vel mittantur divinitus, vel sua sponte labantur, nullam temere affirmare oportebit. Aut enim nondum ista quaestio a divinorum Librorum catholicis tractatoribus pro merito suae obscuritatis et perplexitatis evoluta atque illustrata est; aut si iam factum est, nondum in manus nostras huiuscemodi litterae pervenerunt. Tantum adsit fides nihil de substantia Creatoris falsum indignumque sentiendi. Ad illum enim tendimus itinere pietatis. Si ergo aliud de illo senserimus quam est, intentio nostra non in beatitatem, sed in vanitatem nos ire compellet. De creatura vero si quid aliter quam sese habet senserimus, dummodo non id pro cognito perceptoque teneamus, nullum periculum est. Non enim ad creaturam iubemur tendere ut efficiamur beati, sed ad ipsum Creatorem: de quo si aliud quam oportet ac sese res habet, nobis persuadetur, perniciosissimo errore decipimur. Ad hoc enim pergendo, quod aut non est, aut, si est, non facit beatos, ad beatam vitam nullus pervenire potest.” (Latin text available here: https://www.augustinus.it/latino/libero_arbitrio/index2.htm  - click on 'Liber III')

I found interesting that St. Augustine didn’t condemn, at this time, the belief in the pre-existence of souls but he apparently viewed it as a matter still open to debate. He clearly didn’t personally endorse the belief but, at the same time, he didn’t condemn it. Compare this text from St. Augustine with how St. Pamphilus of Caesarea defended Origen of Alexandria according to this paper by Ambrose Andreano: https://www.academia.edu/44789406/Pamphilus_Justinian_and_the_Preexistence_of_Souls . To be honest, however, there is a difference between the 'Origenist' model of pre-existence, as I understand it, and the two models discussed by Augustine here: in the former souls that inhabit a mortal body do so because of their sin whereas in the models discussed by Augustine they do not participate in this earthily life because of their personal sins.