Extracts about the afterlife in Summa Contra Gentiles (St. Thomas Aquinas)

 

Extracts about the afterlife in Summa Contra Gentiles (St. Thomas Aquinas)

Summa Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 143

On the punishments of mortal and venial sin in relation to the last end

It is clear from what has been said that sin may happen in two ways. In one way, so that the intention of the mind altogether breaks away from its order to God, who is the last end of the good: this is mortal sin. In another way, so that, without prejudice to the human mind’s order to its last end, some obstacle is placed whereby it is hampered in tending freely to its end: this is called venial sin. If, then, punishments must differ according to the difference of sins, it follows that he who sins mortally should be punished so as to forfeit man’s end, but that he who sins venially should be punished not to the extent of forfeiting it, but so as to be hampered, or experience difficulty, in obtaining the end. For thus is the equality of justice maintained: in the same way that man, by sinning voluntarily, turns aside from his end, so by way of punishment, against his will, should he be hindered in the attainment of his end.

Again. The will in man corresponds to the natural inclination in natural things. Now, if a natural thing be deprived of its natural inclination to its end, it is quite unable to reach that end: thus a heavy body will never reach the center if it loses its weight by corruption and becomes light. But if it be hindered in its movement while retaining its inclination to the end, it will reach its end when the obstacle is removed. When a man sins mortally, the intention of his will is altogether turned away from his last end; when he sins venially, his intention remains turned towards his end, yet somewhat hampered, by reason of his adhering more than he ought to those things that are directed to the end. Consequently, the punishment due to one who sins mortally is that he be altogether debarred from obtaining his end, while the punishment due to one who sins venially is that he experience difficulty before attaining his end.

Moreover. When a man gets a good thing unintentionally, this is by luck and chance. If, then, a man whose intention is turned away from his last end obtains that last end, it will be by luck and chance. But this is unreasonable. For the last end is a good of the intelligence, but luck is incompatible with intelligence, since things that happen by chance occur without the bidding of the intellect. And it is unreasonable that the intellect obtain its end otherwise than in an intelligent way. Therefore, a man who has his intention turned away from his last end by sinning mortally will not obtain his last end.

Again. Matter does not receive a form from the agent unless it be disposed to that form. Now the end and the good are the perfection of the will, as form is of matter. Consequently, the will does not obtain the last end unless it be fittingly disposed. But the will is disposed to the end by intending and desiring the end. Therefore, a man will not obtain his end if his intentions be averted from the end.

Moreover. In things ordained to an end, we find that if the end is or will be obtained, we must of necessity presuppose the things required for obtaining it, and if those things be not granted, neither will the end be obtained: for if the end can be obtained without the things directed to the end, it is useless to seek the end by such means. Now, all are agreed that man obtains his last end, which is beatitude, by deeds of virtue, the chief of which is the intention of the right end. Therefore, if a man acts against virtue through turning away from the intention of the last end, it is fitting that he be deprived of his last end.

Hence it is said: Depart from me, you evildoers (Matt 7:23).

(source: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG3.C143  )

Summa Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 144

That by mortal sin man forfeits his last end for eternity

The punishment whereby a man forfeits his last end must be endless.

For one is not deprived of a thing unless it be something one ought to have: thus a kitten newly born is not said to be deprived of sight. Now, in this life, man does not have a natural aptitude to obtain his last end, as we have proved above. Therefore, privation of this end must be a punishment after this life. But man is no longer able to obtain his last end after this life. For the soul needs the body in order to obtain its end, inasmuch as through the body it acquires perfection both in knowledge and in virtue. And the soul, once separated from the body, does not return to this state in which it attains to perfection through the body, as those maintained who held the transmigration of souls, against whom we have argued above. Therefore, the man who is punished by being deprived of his last end must remain punished eternally.

Again. When a thing is deprived of that for which it has a natural aptitude, it cannot be repaired unless it return to preexisting matter so as to be generated anew (as when an animal loses its sight or another sense). But it is impossible for a thing that is already generated to be generated again, unless it first be corrupted: then from the same matter, it will be possible for another to be generated in its entirety, not identically the same, but in species. Now, a spiritual being, such as the soul or an angel, cannot return to preexisting matter so that another be generated anew, the same as before in species. Consequently, if it be deprived of that for which it has a natural aptitude, it must remain eternally thus deprived. Now, in the nature of the soul and of an angel there is the order to the last end, namely God. Therefore, if it be punished by privation of that order, such punishment will remain forever.

Besides. Natural equity would seem to demand that everyone be deprived of that good against which he has acted, since by this he renders himself unworthy of that good. Hence it is that, according to civil justice, he who sins against the state is altogether deprived of the society of his fellow citizens, either by being put to death, or by being condemned to exile for life: nor is any account taken of the time taken in sinning, but of that against which he sinned. Now, the same comparison stands between the whole of the present life and the earthly state as between the whole of eternity and the society of the blessed who, as we showed above, possess their last end eternally. Therefore, he that sins against his last end, and against charity, which is the bond of the society of the blessed and of those who are tending to beatitude, ought to be punished eternally, although his sins may have occupied but a short time.

Moreover. In the divine judgment the will counts for the deed, because as man seeks the things that appear, so the Lord beholds the heart. Now, a man who, for the sake of a temporal good, has turned away from his last end (the possession of which is eternal), has preferred the enjoyment of that temporal good to the eternal fruition of his last end. Evidentl, he would have preferred much more to enjoy that temporal good eternally. Therefore, in the divine judgment, he should be punished as though he had sinned eternally. Now, there can be no doubt that for an eternal sin an eternal punishment is due. Therefore, eternal punishment is due to the man who turns away from his last end.

Further. For the same just reason punishment is rendered for sins, and reward for good deeds. Now, beatitude is the reward of virtue, and beatitude is everlasting, as we have shown. Therefore, the punishment by which one is deprived of beatitude should also be everlasting.

Hence it is said: They will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life (Matt 25:46).

Hereby we refute the error of those who assert that the punishment of the wicked will at length have an end. This statement seems to have originated in the opinion of certain philosophers, who maintained that all punishment is remedial, and therefore terminable at some time.

There seemed to be reasons for this assertion: both because it is customary among men that punishments be inflicted by men’s laws for the correction of vice, so that they are like medicine; and because if the punisher inflicts punishment not for a further purpose but for its own sake, it follows that he delights in punishing for its own sake, which is inconsistent with the divine goodness. Therefore, punishments must be inflicted for a further purpose; and no end seems more fitting than the correction of vice. Consequently, it would seem reasonably stated that all punishments are remedial, and therefore terminable at some time, since what can be remedied is accidental to the creature, and is removable without the substance being destroyed.

It must be granted that God inflicts punishments not for his own sake, as though he took pleasure in them, but for the sake of something else, namely, on account of the order that must be imposed on creatures, in which order the good of the universe consists. Now, the order of things demands that all things be dispensed by God proportionally; for which reason it is said that God does all things in weight, number and measure. And as rewards correspond proportionally to acts of virtue, so do punishments to sins: and to some sins eternal punishment is proportionate, as we have proved. Therefore, for certain sins God inflicts eternal punishment, that in things there may be maintained the right order which shows forth his wisdom.

Even if we were to grant that all punishments are intended for the amendment of morals and for no further purpose, we would not, for that reason, have to assert that all punishments are remedial and terminable. For even according to human laws, some are punished with death for the amendment not of themselves, but of others. Hence it is said: Strike a scoffer, and the fool will be wiser (Prov 19:25). Again, according to human laws, some are banished from the state into perpetual exile, that by being rid of them the state may be purified. Therefore, it is said: Cast out the scoffer, and contention will go out with him, and quarrels and reproaches shall cease (Prov 22:10). Consequently, even if punishments be inflicted only for the amendment of morals, nothing forbids certain men being separated forever, according to the divine judgment, from the fellowship of good men and being punished eternally. This is so that men may refrain from sin for fear of eternal punishment, and the society of the good may be purified through being purged of their presence. Thus it is said: There shall not enter into it, namely, the heavenly Jerusalem, through which is designated the society of good men, anything unclean, or anyone who practices abomination or falsehood (Rev 21:27).

(source: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG3.C144 )

Summa Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 91

That the soul will receive its punishment or reward, as soon as it departs from the body

From what we have said, it may be gathered that immediately after death, the souls of men are punished or rewarded according to their merits.

The separated soul is susceptible to pain both spiritual and bodily, as we have proved. It is also clear from what was said in the third book that it is capable of being glorified, because as soon as the soul departs from the body, it is capable of seeing God, which it could not do so long as it was united to a corruptible body, and man’s ultimate happiness, which is the reward of virtue, consists in seeing God. Now there is no reason for deferring a punishment or reward after the moment in which the soul is capable of receiving them. Therefore, as soon as the soul departs from the body, it receives its punishment or reward for those things which it did while yet in the body.

Again. This life is the time for merit or demerit; therefore, it is compared to military or domestic service. Thus it is said: Has not man a hard service upon earth, and are not his days like the days of a hireling? (Job 7:1). Now reward or punishment is due to those who have served well or ill, as soon as their service is ended. Therefore, it is said: The wages of a hired servant shall not remain with you all night until the morning (Lev 19:13); and the Lord said: I will requite your deed upon your own head swiftly and speedily (Joel 3:4). Therefore, the soul will receive its reward or punishment immediately after death.

Again. The order in punishment and reward should correspond to the order in fault and merit. Now merit and fault are not ascribed to the body except through the soul, since nothing is deserving of praise or blame except insofar as it is voluntary. Consequently, both reward and punishment are awarded to the body through the soul, and not to the soul on account of the body. Hence there is no reason why the punishment or reward of the soul should await its reunion with the body. Indeed, it would seem more fitting that the soul, which was the first to be the subject of sin or merit, should be the first to be punished or rewarded.

Moreover. By the same divine providence as provides natural things with the perfections due to them, rewards and punishments are due to the rational creature. Now each natural thing receives at once the perfection of which it is capable, unless there be an obstacle either on the part of the recipient or on the part of the agent. Since, then, the soul is capable of receiving either glory or punishment as soon as it departs from the body, it follows that the reward of the good and the punishment of the wicked are not delayed until the reunion of soul and body.

We must observe, however, with regard to the good, that there may be something to prevent their souls from receiving their ultimate reward (consisting in the vision of God) as soon as they are separated from the body. The rational creature cannot be raised to that vision unless it be wholly purified, since that vision surpasses the entire natural faculty of the creature. Hence it is said of wisdom that nothing defiled gains entrance into her (Wis 7:25), and that the unclean shall not pass over it (Isa 35:8). Now the soul is defiled by sin, whereby it adheres inordinately to things beneath it. In this life it is cleansed from this defilement by penance and the other sacraments, as stated above. Sometimes, however, it happens that this cleansing is not entirely completed in this life, but the soul still owes a debt of punishment either through neglect, or occupation, or because it has been surprised by death. Nevertheless, it does not for this reason deserve to be wholly deprived of its reward, since these things may happen without mortal sin, which alone takes away charity, to which the reward of eternal life is due, as we have stated in the third book. Consequently, after this life, that soul will need to be cleansed before it can receive its final reward. Now this cleansing is effected by means of punishment, even as in this life the soul might have been cleansed by satisfactory punishment: otherwise the negligent would be better off than the prudent if in the next life they were not to suffer for their sins the punishment they failed to undergo in this life. Therefore, the souls of the just which have something that could have been cleansed in this world are debarred from receiving their reward until they have suffered a purgatorial punishment. This is why we hold that there is a purgatory.

We are justified in this statement by the words of the Apostle: If any man’s work is burned up, he will suffer loss, though he himself will be saved, but only as through fire (1 Cor 3:15). This is confirmed by the universal custom of the Church in praying for the dead, since such prayers would be useless if there were no purgatory after death. For the Church prays not for those who are already in the final term of a good or evil life, but for those who have not yet reached it.

That the soul receives its pain or punishment immediately after death, provided there be no obstacle, is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. Of the wicked it is said: They spend their days in prosperity, and in a moment they go down to hell (Job 21:13); and: The rich man also died and was buried in hell (Luke 16:22); for hell is the place where souls are punished. The same is clear with regard to the just. Thus our Lord, while hanging on the cross, said to the thief: Today you will be with me in Paradise (Luke 23:43); and by paradise is meant the reward that is promised to the just: To him who conquers I will grant to eat of the tree of life, which is in the paradise of God (Rev 2:7).

Some say, however, that paradise does not mean the final reward that will be in heaven, according to Matthew 5:12: Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven, but an earthly reward. For paradise would seem to indicate a place on earth, on account of its being said that the Lord God planted a paradise of pleasure, and there he put the man whom he had formed (Gen 2:8). Nevertheless, if we consider the words of Sacred Scripture, we shall find that the final reward which is promised in heaven to the saints is bestowed immediately after this life. For the Apostle, after speaking of the final glory, says: This slight momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison, because we look not to the things that are seen but to the things that are unseen; for the things that are seen are transient, but the things that are unseen are eternal (2 Cor 4:17–18); here he evidently is speaking of the final glory which is in heaven. Then, in order to show when and how this glory is to be bestowed, he adds: We know that if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens (2 Cor 5:1). This evidently means that when the body is being delivered to corruption, the soul is taken into the eternal and heavenly mansion, which is no less than the enjoyment of the divinity together with the angels in heaven.

And if someone choose to contradict this by maintaining that the Apostle did not say that as soon as the body is given over to dissolution, we are to have an eternal dwelling in heaven in reality, but only in hope, and that at length we are to have it in reality, it is clear that this is contrary to the meaning of the Apostle. For even while we live here below, we are to have a heavenly habitation, according to divine predestination, so that we have it already in hope: For in this hope we are saved (Rom 8:24). Consequently, there would be no purpose in his adding: If the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, since it would have sufficed him to say, we know . . .we have a building from God. This is made clearer still by what he says further on: We know that while we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith, not by sight. We are of good courage, and we would rather be away from the body and at home with the Lord (2 Cor 5:6–8). Now there would be no use in our desiring to be away, that is separated, from the body, unless we were to be at once at home with the Lord. But we are not present, unless he is present to our sight, since as long as we walk by faith and not by sight . . . we are away from the Lord. Therefore, as soon as the soul of the just man is separated from the body, it sees God; and this is final beatitude, as we have proved in the third book. The same conclusion is proved by the words of the same Apostle: My desire is to dissolve and be with Christ (Phil 1:23). Now Christ is in heaven; therefore, the Apostle desired to go to heaven as soon as his body was dissolved.

This disposes of the error of certain Greeks, who deny purgatory and say that souls, before the resurrection of the bodies, neither ascend into heaven nor are cast into hell.

(source: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG4.C91 )

Summa Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 92

That immediately after death the souls of the just have their will fixed unchangeably on the good

It follows from what we have said that the soul, as soon as it is separated from the body, becomes unchangeable in its will, so that it can no more be changed from good to evil, or from evil to good.

As long as the soul can be changed from good to evil, or from evil to good, it is in a state of conflict and warfare, since it needs either to be watchful in resisting evil, lest it be overcome by it, or to strive to be delivered from it. As soon as it is separated from the body, however, it will no longer be in a state of warfare or conflict, but of receiving the reward or punishment according as it has striven rightly or wrongly; for it has been proved that it will receive its reward or punishment at once. Therefore, the soul will no longer have a changeable will as regards good and evil.

Again. It has been proved that happiness, consisting in the vision of God, is everlasting. It has also been proved that eternal punishment is due to mortal sin. Now the soul cannot be happy if its will is not right, for it ceases to be right through being turned away from its end, and it is right by enjoying its end. It cannot be turned away from it and enjoy it at the same time. Therefore, the rectitude of the will in the beatified soul must be everlasting, and cannot turn away from good to evil.

Further. The rational creature naturally desires to be happy. Hence it cannot desire not to be happy; yet it can, by its will, turn from that in which true happiness consists, and then its will is perverse. The reason for this is because instead of apprehending that in which true happiness consists as being happiness, it takes for happiness something else, to which the disordered will turns as though that thing were its end. Thus, for instance, the man who places his end in bodily pleasures takes them to be the best thing, and this is what is meant by happiness. On the other hand, the blessed apprehend that in which true beatitude consists as being their happiness and last end: otherwise their appetite would not rest in it, and they would not be truly happy. Therefore, whoever is in the state of heavenly bliss cannot turn his will away from that in which is true happiness. Consequently, his will cannot be perverse.

Again. Whosoever has sufficient for himself seeks for nothing else. Now that in which true happiness consists is enough for each of the blessed: otherwise his desire would not be fulfilled. Therefore, every one of the blessed seeks nothing that does not pertain to that in which true happiness consists. But no one has a perverse will unless he desires something incompatible with that in which true happiness consists. Therefore, the will of the blessed cannot be changed to evil.

Further. There is no sin in the will without ignorance in the intellect, for we will nothing but what is either really good or seemingly good. Hence it is said: They err that devise evil (Prov 14:22); and the Philosopher declares that every wicked man is ignorant. But the truly beatified soul cannot be ignorant, since it sees whatever pertains to its own perfection in God: consequently, by no means can it have an evil will, especially seeing that the beatific vision is always actual, as we proved in the third book.

Moreover. Our intellect can err about conclusions before tracing them back to first principles, but when this has been done, its knowledge of the conclusion is scientific, and in such knowledge error is impossible. Now, the end in matters relating to the appetite is like the principle of demonstration is in speculative matters. Therefore, as long as our will has not obtained its last end, it can be perverse, but not after it has attained to the enjoyment of the last end, which is desirable for itself even as the first principles of demonstration are evident in themselves.

Again. The good, as such, is lovable. Therefore, that which is apprehended as supremely good is most lovable. Now in seeing God, the beatified rational substance apprehends him as supremely good; therefore, it loves God above all things. Moreover, it is a part of love that those who love each other should be of one will. Therefore, the will of the blessed is perfectly conformed to God, since the divine will is the supreme rule of all wills: and consequently the will of those who see God cannot be perverse.

Further. As long as a thing can acquire something else it has not reached its final end. Therefore, if a beatified soul can be changed from good to evil, it has not reached its ultimate end: and this is inconsistent with beatitude. Consequently, the soul that is beatified immediately after death becomes unchangeable in its will.

(source: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG4.C92 )

Summa Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 93

That the souls of the wicked after death have their will fixed unchangeably on evil

In like manner, the souls which are punished by being deprived of happiness immediately after death become unchangeable in their will.

It has been proved that, for mortal sin, the soul is condemned to eternal punishment. But this punishment of the soul would not be everlasting if its will could be changed for the better, since it would be unjust if its punishment continued after its will is good. Therefore, the will of a lost soul cannot turn towards the good.

Further. The very disorder of the will is a punishment, and is most painful, since when a man has a disordered will, good deeds are displeasing to him. The damned will be distressed to see in all things the fulfilment of God’s will, which by sinning they had resisted. Therefore, they will never lose their disordered will.

Again. The will does not turn from sin to goodness except by God’s grace, as we have proved. Now, whereas the souls of the just are admitted to perfect participation in the divine goodness, the souls of the damned are utterly excluded from grace. Therefore, the lost souls are unable to change their will for the better.

Again. Whereas the just look to God as the end of all their deeds and desires while in the flesh, the wicked look to an unlawful end which turns them away from God. Now the separated souls of the just will adhere unchangeably to God as the end to which they looked in this life. Therefore, the souls of the wicked will adhere unchangeably to the end which they have chosen for themselves. Hence, as the will of the just will be unchangeable to evil, so the will of the wicked will be unchangeable to the good.

(source: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG4.C93 )

Summa Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 94

The unchangeableness of will of the souls in purgatory

However, some souls do not attain beatitude as soon as they depart, and yet are not damned. Such are those who depart with something that needs to be cleansed, as stated above. We must prove, then, that neither do these souls admit of a change in their will after they have been separated from the body. We have shown that both blessed and damned have an unchangeable will, as regards the end to which they adhered. Now the souls that finally depart with something that needs to be cleansed do not differ from the souls of the blessed in that they depart in charity, whereby we adhere to God as our end. Therefore, they also have an unchangeable will.

(source: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG4.C94 )

Extract from the Summa Contra Gentiles in which St. Thomas Aquinas criticizes reincarnation and ‘Origenism’

Summa Contra Gentiles, book 2, chapter 44

That distinction among things did not result from the diversity of merits or demerits

It remains now for us to show that the distinction among things did not result from different movements of the free will of rational creatures, as Origen maintained in his Peri Archon. For he wished to refute the objections and errors of the early heretics, who strove to prove that the different nature of good and evil in things is owing to contrary agents. But on account of the great difference which he observed both in natural and in human things, which difference apparently is not preceded by any merits—for instance, that some bodies are white, some dark, that some are born of pagans, some of Christians—he was compelled to assert that all differences to be found in things have proceeded from a difference of merits, in accordance with the justice of God. For he says that God, of his mere goodness, first made all creatures equal, all of them being spiritual and rational, and these by their free will were moved in diverse ways, some adhering to God more, and some less, some withdrawing from God more, and some less. In this way, there resulted various grades in spiritual substances through divine justice, so that some were angels in their various orders, some human souls in their various states, some demons in their various states. On account of the diversity among rational creatures, he said that God had established diversity among corporeal creatures, so that the more noble spiritual substances were united to the more noble bodies, and thus the corporeal creature would minister in all other various ways to the diversity of spiritual substances.

But this opinion is clearly convicted of falsehood. For among effects, the better a thing is, the more does it obtain precedence in the intention of the agent. Now the greatest good in things created is the perfection of the universe, consisting in the order of distinct things, because in all things the perfection of the whole takes precedence of the perfection of each part. Therefore, the diversity of things results from the principal intention of the first agent, and not from a diversity of merits.

Again. If all rational creatures were created equal from the beginning, we must say that one of them does not depend on another in its action. Now that which results from the concurrence of various causes, one of which does not depend on another, is casual. Therefore, according to the aforesaid opinion, this distinction and order of things is casual: and this is impossible, as proved above.

Moreover. That which is natural to a person is not acquired by him by his will, for the movement of the will, or free will, presupposes the existence of the willer, and for this his nature is required. Accordingly, if the various grades of rational creatures were derived from a movement of the free will, all rational creatures would have their respective grade not naturally, but accidentally. But this is impossible. For, since the specific difference is natural to each thing, it would follow that all created rational substances—namely, angels, demons, human souls, and the souls of the heavenly bodies (which Origen supposed to be animated)—are of one species. That this is false is proved by the diversity of natural actions, because the mode by which the human intellect naturally understands is not the same as that which sense and imagination, or the angelic intellect and the soul of the sun demand—unless perhaps we picture the angels and heavenly bodies with flesh and bones and like parts, so that they may have organs of sense, which is absurd. It follows, therefore, that the diversity of intellectual substances is not the result of a diversity of merits, which are according to movements of the free will.

Again. If things that are natural are not acquired by a movement of the free will, in contrast, the union of a rational soul with such a body is acquired by the soul on account of preceding merit or demerit according to the movement of the free will, it would follow that the union of this soul with this body is not natural. Therefore, neither is the composite natural. Yet man and the sun and the stars, according to Origen, are composed of rational substances and such and such bodies. Therefore, all these things which are the noblest of corporeal substances are unnatural.

Again. If the union of this rational substance with this body is becoming to this rational substance not as such a substance, but as having so merited, its union with this body is not an essential but an accidental union. Now, a species does not result from things united accidentally, because from such a union there does not result a thing essentially one: for “white man” or “clothed man” is not a species. It would follow, therefore, that man is not a species, nor yet the sun, nor the moon, nor anything of the kind.

Moreover. Those things which result from merit may be changed for better or for worse, because merits and demerits may increase or diminish, especially according to Origen, who said that the free will of every creature is always flexible to either side. Therefore, if a rational soul has been allotted this body on account of preceding merit or demerit, it will follow that it can be united again to another body, and not only that the human soul takes another human body, but also that it may sometimes take a sidereal body, which is in accordance with the Pythagorean fable, that any soul enters any body. This is both erroneous according to philosophy—which teaches that determinate matters and movables are allotted to determinate forms and movers—and heretical according to faith, which declares that in the resurrection the soul resumes the same body which it has left.

Further. Since there can be no multitude without distinction, if from the beginning rational creatures were formed in any number, they must have had some diversity. Therefore, one of them had something which another had not. And if this was not the result of a difference in merit, for the same reason neither was it necessary for the difference of grades to result from a difference of merits.

Again. Every distinction is either according to a division of quantity, which is only in bodies—therefore, according to Origen, it could not be in the bodies first created—or according to formal division. But this latter cannot be without distinction of grades, since such a distinction is reduced to that of privation and form: and thus one of the condivided forms must be better and the other less good. Hence, according to the Philosopher, the species of things are like numbers, one of which is in addition to or in subtraction from the other. Accordingly, if there were many rational substances created from the beginning, there must have been a distinction of grades among them.

Again. If rational creatures can subsist without bodies, there was no need to set up a distinction in the corporeal nature on account of the various merits of rational creatures, since even without a diversity of bodies it was possible to find various grades in rational substances. And if rational substances cannot subsist without bodies, it follows that the corporeal creature also was formed from the beginning together with the rational creature. Now, the corporeal creature is further removed from the spiritual than spiritual creatures are from one another. If, therefore, from the beginning God established such a great distance among his creatures without any previous merits, there was no need for a difference of merits to precede in order that rational creatures should be established in different grades.

Again. If the diversity of the corporeal creature results from the different movements of the rational creature’s free will, we shall have to say that the reason why there is only one sun in the world is because only one rational creature was moved by its free will in such a way as to merit to be united to such a body. Now, it was by chance that only one sinned thus. Therefore, it is by chance that there is only one sun in the world, and not for the need of corporeal nature.

Further. Since the spiritual creature does not merit to be degraded except for sin—yet it is degraded from its height, in which it is invisible, through being united to visible bodies—it would seem to follow that visible bodies are joined to spiritual creatures on account of sin. And this would seem to approach to the error of the Manicheans who said that these visible things proceeded from the evil principle.

The authority of Sacred Scripture is in evident contradiction with this error. For in each making of visible creatures Moses speaks in terms such as these: God saw that it was good (Gen 1:9), and afterwards in reference to all, he adds: God saw everything that he had made, and it was very good (Gen 1:31). Hence we are clearly given to understand that the corporeal and visible creatures were made because it is good for them to be, and this is in keeping with the divine goodness, and not on account of any merits or sins of rational creatures.

Origen seems not to have taken into consideration that when we give a thing not as a due, but as a free gift, it is not contrary to justice if we give unequal things without weighing the difference of merits, since payment is due to those who merit. Now God, as stated above, brought things into being not as though it were due to them, but out of mere bounty. Therefore, the diversity of creatures does not presuppose diversity of merits.

Again, since the good of the whole is better than the good of each part, it does not befit the best maker to lessen the good of the whole in order to increase the good of some of the parts: thus a builder does not give to the foundation the goodness which he gives to the roof, lest he should make a house in ruins. Therefore, God, the maker of all, would not make the whole universe the best of its kind if he made all the parts equal, because many degrees of goodness would be wanting to the universe, and thus it would be imperfect.

(source: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~SCG2.C44 )