Another argument against the theistic views that accept exclusivism and a possible irreversible perdition
Another argument against the theistic views that accept exclusivism and a possible irreversible perdition
In this post, I'll provide an argument against all variations of theistic views that accept the possibility of irreversible loss (a state of endless concious torment, irreversible annihilation and so on) and exclusivism, the view that some kind of outward, public behaviour is necessary for salvation (e.g. visibly entering some kind of tradition).
More clearly, I will try to show that, with a thought experiment, the following triad of propositions is inconsistent:
(1) God wants that each human being will experience eternal bliss (which is the Highest Good for any human being).
(2) a state of irreversible perdition is a possible final state for any human being
(3) exclusivism holds: a necessary condition to avoid irreversible perdition is to make some act/choice that is, in principle, visible to others.
Consider the following situation. Alice and Bob commit a grave sin (e.g. a murder, or even choosing the wrong religion under some accounts and so on). One day, Alice and Bob have a car accident which, for the sake of the argument is caused by someone else. Both experience fatal wounds. Rescuers arrive and manage to save Alice, whereas Bob dies. After the accident, Alice has a change of heart and makes a visible act that is necessary for salvation. Let's say that Alice then dies and is saved. Bob, however, died lacking the necessary condition (2) and, therefore, he is irreversibly lost.
So, it is clear to me that you have to either abandon one of the three propositions above. If (1) and (2) hold, arguably this means that God will at least offer some kind of opportunity for salvation for each human being that can be rejected only under that human being's choice: it cannot depend on the choices of others. If (2) and (3) hold it is clear that (1) is denied. Considering that God would at least expect or even foreknow that some will not satisfy condition (3), it is hard to imagine that God can desire something that He expect or even knows eternally that won't happen (in the case of foreknowledge it is IMO just a logical impossibility). If (1) and (3) are true, then we have to modify exclusivism, by meaning that further chances will be given after death.
So, in my opinion, this argument is definitive against all those positions that try to accept all three propositions above. It does not apply, though, to all non-universalist positions. Rejecting (1), though, raises to what purpose would God create at least some human beings. If one reject (3), the only possibile alternative is the 'free will' defense of (eternal) perdition, which is, interestingly, enough is the most 'tenderhearted' version of anti-universalism (because it still present God as truly willing to save all). I know that the latter has its own problems, especially if classical theism is accepted but I think that arguments like this are important for many people.
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