On the tension between the Buddhist doctrines of karma and ‘not-self’
On the
tension between the Buddhist doctrines of karma and ‘not-self’
Almost all
Buddhist traditions agree on the doctrines of ‘karma’ and ‘not-self’ (anatman).
The first doctrine says that each sentient being will experience the positive
and negative effects of good or bad actions either in this life or in a future
lifetime. The second doctrine says that there
is no temporal or eternal ‘unchanging self’ (atman) or static identity in each
being[1].
Nowadays,
the doctrine of ‘not-self’ is generally used by non-Buddhists (and even some
Buddhist) to criticize the possibility of rebirth in a next life.
Indeed, if there is no unchanging self, how can one speak of a future rebirth?
However, it should be noted that precisely the doctrine of ‘not-self’ can
explain how, for instance, a male human being can become a female ant, without
contradiction.
Indeed, if
sentient beings are ‘empty’ of an unchanging essence, they have no defining characteristics.
So, in the above case, it is possible to posit a continuity between the
states ‘male human’ and ‘female ant’ if one assumes that there is no being that
has as an essential characteristic either being human, ant, male or female[2].
However, I believe
that the Buddhist notion of ‘anatman’, at least if interpreted as a denial of
a truly existing unchanging essence, leads to two serious difficulties:
1) The first difficulty is how to make
sense of a concept like ‘moral accountability’ if one holds to the doctrine of ‘not-self’.
If we can’t say that the agent of an action and the agent that experiences the ‘karmic’
consequences of that actions are the same agent, how can we have an
intelligible account of moral accountability? It doesn’t seem the case that
continuity alone is sufficient to explain accountability.
2) The second and, perhaps, more
serious difficulty is the following one. Essences with defining characteristics
posit a constraint on how something can change. We may say, for instance, that
an acorn seed can become a oak tree but not a lemon tree because the acorn’s
nature can only lead the seed to become an oak tree. If there weren’t essences,
why changes present regularities? If the doctrine of karma was true, it is
clearly an instance of an orderly change. However, if there are no
essences, how can we explain these constraints on how ‘transformations’ happen?
Why, for instance, isn’t karma totally unintelligible?
Personally,
I never found convincing arguments against these two objections.
[1] Only the Pudgalavada school, to my
knowledge, endorsed the idea of an ‘indeterminate self’. However, the second
difficulty, in my opinion, also applies to their doctrine. If the self is
indeterminate, how can we explain the orderliness of ‘karma’?
[2] In other words, if being a human is
essential for a given sentient being, that sentient being can’t turn into an
ant in a future lifetime without being annihilated and ‘replaced’ by a
completely different being, an ant.
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