Hope vs Justice: the case of intercessions

 

Hope vs Justice: the case of intercessions

Let me begin with a quotation of the 21th book of the City of God, chapter 18, written by Augustine of Hyppo (354-430):

There are others, again, with whose opinions I have become acquainted in conversation, who, though they seem to reverence the holy Scriptures, are yet of reprehensible life, and who accordingly, in their own interest, attribute to God a still greater compassion towards men.  For they acknowledge that it is truly predicted in the divine word that the wicked and unbelieving are worthy of punishment, but they assert that, when the judgment comes, mercy will prevail.  For, say they, God, having compassion on them, will give them up to the prayers and intercessions of His saints.  For if the saints used to pray for them when they suffered from their cruel hatred, how much more will they do so when they see them prostrate and humble suppliants?  For we cannot, they say, believe that the saints shall lose their bowels of compassion when they have attained the most perfect and complete holiness; so that they who, when still sinners, prayed for their enemies, should now, when they are freed from sin, withhold from interceding for their suppliants.  Or shall God refuse to listen to so many of His beloved children, when their holiness has purged their prayers of all hindrance to His answering them?  And the passage of the psalm which is cited by those who admit that wicked men and infidels shall be punished for a long time, though in the end delivered from all sufferings, is claimed also by the persons we are now speaking of as making much more for them.  The verse runs:  “Shall God forget to be gracious?  Shall He in anger shut up His tender mercies?” His anger, they say, would condemn all that are unworthy of everlasting happiness to endless punishment.  But if He suffer them to be punished for a long time, or even at all, must He not shut up His tender mercies, which the Psalmist implies He will not do?  For he does not say, Shall He in anger shut up His tender mercies for a long period? but he implies that He will not shut them up at all.[1]

If we try to set aside for the present moment the ‘ad hominem’ attack in the first sentence, I believe that these ‘others’ that Augustine refer to are an ancient evidence of a deep tension that is present within the most forms of Christianity, i.e. those which claim that the fate of the damned is irreversible.  Although the position that Augustine attributes to them seems quite extreme, i.e. there is no after-life punishment at all, some versions of it seem to have precedents in some older texts, like some versions of the ‘Apocalypse of Peter’ and others, in which God is seen as liberating from punishments those whom they saints are praying on behalf[2]. In contrast to Augustine’s opponents, these texts seem to claim that the ‘damned’ will experience a temporary punishments but they will be released by God’s grace to satisfy the desire of the blessed.

The ‘tension’, however, I am referring to is the following. Let’s say that, for the sake of the argument, that, indeed, the damned deserve, in some sense, a truly unending punishment (of whatever form).  Even so, however, I believe that there are at least two problems that remain:

1.       Assuming that repentance (or conversion) is salvific, it is a way to escape ‘getting what one deserves’. So, if justice demands “giving people what they deserve”, in the case of those who repent, the fact that they are not given what they deserve seem a negation of the demands of justice. So repentance in this life represents a way in which a ‘just sentence’ can be reversed. So one might ask: why couldn’t be the case that such a just sentence can be reversed in the future life?

2.       There are indeed scriptural passages where Christians are said explicitly to love and pray for their ‘enemies’ or ‘all human beings’[3]. Now given that ‘eternal beatitude’ is the highest good for human beings, this seems to clearly imply that Christians should desire such a blessed fate for all human beings, including their enemies. However, if some human beings are lost forever, i.e. they do not experience eternal life but their unending punishments we are assuming they deserve, this desire, motivated by love seems to be in fact thwarted.

Especially the second problem I highlighted seems to be the main motivator behind these views that see intercession as a way for save what seems to be unsalvable. If one is sure that some people will be eternally lost, how could one desire eternal life for all[4]? If one already knows that some people will be lost forever, how could one hope for the salvation of each human being?

Hence, if we assume that human beings can deserve a truly unending punishment (of whatever sorts), the problem of ‘accepting’ the actualization of that deserved state remains. Under what circumstances, we might ask, are we allowed to think accept that we can stop desire and hope for the realization of the ‘highest good’ for them?

So, here is the retort we can imagine that Augustine’s opponents would give to him:

“Let’s say that, indeed, human beings can deserve an irreversible loss as their ultimate fate. If this is true, however, you are asking us to accept the fact that our desire and hope for the salvation of others might (or even will) fail and likewise our prayers in their behalf might (or even will) fail. But if the failure is indeed certain and we should be aware of this certainty of failure, as you seem to claim, how can we consistently desire, hope and pray in that way?”

 



[3] I am referring to these passages: Matthew 5:43-48, Luke 6:27-36 and 1 Timothy 2:1-4

[4] Love, desire for and hope for the eternal beatitude of others seem to be linked together as even the extremely influential Thomas Aquinas (fl. 13th century) seems to have grasped a link between of all them, without however endorsing a ‘hope for all’, as I show now.

Here, he claims that we are bound to love all human beings:

"I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom 12:21): Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good." (bold mine, source: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.II-II.Q108.A1.SC )

Here he claims that if we love all human beings, we wish them all 'everlasting happiness':

"In this respect we love all men equally out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good, namely everlasting happiness. Second love is said to be greater through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not to love all equally." (source: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.II-II.Q26.A6.C.3 ; bold mine)

And finally, he says that, if we are bound by love with someone, we can hope eternal life for them:

"Therefore hope regards directly one’s own good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another’s eternal life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another." (source: https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.II-II.Q17.A3.SC )

 

Comments

  1. As for Christian texts that allow post-mortem salvation via 'intercession', one can consider also the case of the Ethiopian Kristos Samra (fl. probably in the 15th century):
    https://wendybelcher.com/african-literature/the-life-of-kristos-samra/ (a translation of the relevant text)

    https://it.scribd.com/document/68019468/Saint-Kirstos-Semra-s-Hagiography-2011-de-Birhan (at pp. 6-8 one finds another translation)

    https://www.academia.edu/39782156/The_Life_and_Visions_of_Kr%C9%99stos_%C5%9A%C3%A4mra_a_Fifteenth_Century_Ethiopian_Woman_Saint_Kristos_Samra_ (a paper on Kristos Samra)

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